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Abstract 
This paper uses a unique Bank of Canada panel data set to assess the impact of 
information-based contagion on the foreign asset exposures of Canadian banks. Specifically, 
banks’ foreign asset exposures include loans, deposits and holdings of public and private 
securities from 1984 to 2003 on a quarterly basis vis-à-vis over 150 foreign jurisdictions. 
Preliminary results find that, conditional on fundamentals, banks do not adjust their overall 
asset portfolios immediately in the presence of crisis events. However, there is weak 
evidence that the composition of foreign claims adjusts in the presence of informational 
contagion. 
1. Introduction 
The role of banks as intermediaries in global financial markets continues to evolve as 
regulatory reform, financial product innovation and information technology allow them to 
further broaden the scope of intermediation activity. A popular perception of this process is 
that banks have become more globalised, as witnessed by their ever increasing operations in 
foreign jurisdictions. Canadian banks are no exception. At the same time, this perceived rise 
in the global nature of banks has occurred during a period of increased financial fragility. The 
1990s witnessed a plenitude of banking, currency, financial and sovereign debt crises (Glick 
and Hutchinson (1999)). In particular, the recent Asian, LTCM and Russian crises focused 
the attention of policymakers and academics alike on the notion that contagion may have 
disruptive effects on global financial markets and ultimately, financial stability. 
Unfortunately, little progress has been made on empirically identifying the existence of 
contagion (Karolyi (2003)). Simply, it is difficult to determine if the response of financial 
market participants to crisis events reflects the effects of interdependency, ie fundamentals, 
or that of “informational contagion.” The objective of this paper is to address whether 
financial intermediaries respond to informational contagion above and beyond what is 
warranted by fundamentals. Three questions are considered. First, do Canadian bank’s total 
foreign asset exposures respond to contagious crisis events? Second, do these banks adjust 
the composition of their portfolios? And third, does local information matter? That is, in 
response to crisis events, do locally booked claims respond more adversely than claims 
booked in the banks’ head office?  
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 In order to address these questions, this paper uses a unique Bank of Canada panel data set 
on Canadian banks’ foreign asset exposures. The data extend from 1984 to 2003 on a 
quarterly basis for a set of Canadian banks with claims in over 150 foreign jurisdictions. 
Banks’ foreign asset exposures include loans and deposits vis-à-vis foreign firms, banks, and 
public sector entities, and holdings of public and private securities. Additionally, foreign asset 
exposures can be disaggregated into claims booked in the foreign jurisdiction and those 
booked in Canada. I find that, conditional on fundamentals, banks do not adjust their 
portfolios immediately in the presence of crisis events. This suggests that informational 
contagion is not an important determinant of Canadian bank portfolio behaviour. However, 
the composition of bank foreign asset portfolios adjusts in response to crisis events. 
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on banking 
crises and contagion. Section 3 offers a theoretical framework for assessing the effects of 
crisis events on the composition of Canadian banks’ portfolios. Section 4 presents the 
empirical model and Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents descriptive statistics 
and offers regression results of the effect of banking crises on the behaviour of Canadian 
banks’ foreign asset exposures. Section 7 concludes and offers future avenues for research. 
2.   Literature review 
The effect of crisis events and contagion on the behaviour and composition of Canadian 
foreign bank exposures has not been examined in the economics literature.
1 More generally, 
there are few empirical studies that examine the existence of contagion and banking crises.
2 
The definition of contagion is, naturally, a source of some contention. For the purposes of 
this study, contagion will be defined in terms of “informational” contagion. In this case, 
informational contagion is the process by which the occurrence of an event in one market 
affects other markets, above and beyond the effect consistent with fundamentals. This 
definition of contagion seeks to distinguish itself from simple “interdependency”, or 
“fundamentals-based” contagion.
3
The evidence of informational contagion and bank behaviour is limited. At the macro-level, 
Santor (2003) assesses whether a banking crisis is more likely to occur when a country 
shares similar characteristics with another country experiencing a crisis. On average, the 
occurrence of a banking crisis leads to the higher likelihood of a future crisis if the countries 
appear similar in terms of macro fundamentals. However, the use of macroeconomic data 
prevents identification of the contagion effect separately from the common shocks that may 
be driving fundamentals. 
                                                  
1   Freedman (1998) and Armstrong (1997) describe Canadian banks’ aggregate foreign currency exposures 
from the 1950s to the early 1990s, but the analysis does not extend to the level and composition of foreign 
asset exposures. 
2    Substantial empirical literature seeks to determine whether banking crises can be characterised and/or 
predicted. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 1998 and 2002), Eichengreen and Rose (1998), 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), Glick and Hutchinson (1999), Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1998), and Hernandez and Valdes (2001), among others, provide mixed evidence for the 
determinants of banking crises. Banking crises are related to slow economic growth, high inflation, high real 
interest rates, declining terms of trade, poor legal and accounting standards, and lower per capita income. 
With respect to institutional features, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998 and 2002) find that deposit 
insurance is positively related to banking crises, as is financial liberalisation. There is considerable empirical 
literature on the incidence of contagion in financial markets and with respect to currency crises. See 
Rigobon (1999) for a standard treatment. 
3    “Fundamentals-based” contagion is the process by which common shocks are propagated by real-side 
economic activity (Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000)). 
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 Similarly, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) provide evidence that capital flows to emerging 
markets are affected by the occurrence of banking crises, given that the affected countries 
share common lenders with the crisis country. Similarly, Peria, Powell and Hollar (2002) 
show that contagion can affect capital flows to emerging markets through the impact of 
domestic shocks. Specifically, the foreign claims of domestic banks are affected by shocks to 
the domestic economy. However, this effect has diminished over time, since they find that 
host country conditions matter more, and thus lending has become less “indiscriminate”. This 
is due to the fact that an increasing proportion of foreign claims are booked in the foreign 
jurisdiction, and thus banks are more apt to take country effects into account. Lastly, 
Jeanneau and Micu (2002) explore the determinants of international bank lending, again with 
aggregate BIS data. They find “significant” evidence of herding, as European banks followed 
UK and US bank behaviour. They also find evidence of regional contagion, as lenders 
tended to substitute lending from crisis areas to non-crisis areas in the late 1990s.
4
A shortcoming of the studies cited above, and more generally for the current literature on 
banking crises and contagion, is that the empirical methodology often confounds the effects 
of real-side interdependencies with informational contagion (Karolyi (2003)). The objective of 
this paper is to mitigate this shortcoming: that is, to try to distinguish between the notion of 
“fundamentals-driven” contagion, and pure “informational” contagion. Simply, can one find 
empirical evidence that the arrival of information that is orthogonal to observed fundamentals 
leads to a change in the level and composition of foreign asset exposures of Canadian 
banks?  
3.   Theoretical framework 
The motivating assumption of most empirical work on contagion and bank capital flows is 
that banks follow an optimal portfolio rule that responds to changes in fundamentals and, to 
some extent, to information. For example, Goldberg’s (2001) framework is predicated on the 
assumption that banks follow a portfolio rule to determine the level and change in foreign 
asset exposures. Specifically, foreign asset exposures vary according to innovations in 
changes in foreign and domestic interest rates, and foreign and domestic GDP growth rates. 
Similarly, the aggregate level studies of foreign bank exposures using BIS data also implicitly 
invoke a “portfolio” theory of banks’ foreign asset exposures. For example, these studies rely 
on the argument that the arrival of “information” from the crisis events may cause banks to 
reduce not only their asset position in the event country, but in related countries as well. 
Thus, the question then arises as to what kind of portfolio rules generate the responses 
typically cited in the contagion literature. 
Schinasi and Smith (1999) offer a useful framework in which to place the expected behaviour 
of banks during crisis events. In their model, banks choose a portfolio with a position in risky 
assets.
5 The risky assets can be thought of as the foreign asset claims of banks to various 
countries. Given information at time t regarding the conditional joint normal returns over the 
means, variance, covariances and conditional correlations of the risky assets i and j, portfolio 
managers choose portfolio weights accordingly. Schinasi and Smith then describe three 
portfolio rules that bank managers could potentially follow: the expected return benchmarking 
                                                  
4   At the micro-level, Goldberg (2001), Palmer (2000) and Bonfin and Nelson (1999) analyse the behaviour of 
the foreign asset exposure of US banks, but do not explicitly explore the composition of foreign asset 
exposures, nor their response to crisis events. A related literature explores the effects of contagion within the 
interbank market. For example, see Upper and Worms (2004). 
5   This section follows Schinasi and Smith (1999) directly. 
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 rule, the tradeoff rule and the loss constraint rule. The usefulness of defining these three 
portfolio rules is seen when Schinasi and Smith assess the impact of a change in the 
variance of one asset, and how each portfolio rule requires the bank to alter its weight in both 
the event asset and the other asset in the portfolio. For example, what would happen if the 
bank held claims against Colombia and Mexico, and Mexico suffered a banking crisis? 
Naturally, the crisis would lead to an increase in the volatility of returns in Mexico. The 
question Schinasi and Smith wish to evaluate is what kind of portfolio rule would induce the 
bank to reduce (or increase) its foreign asset exposures to Colombia.  
Given a “volatility event” (such as a banking crisis) which is defined as an event at time t 
which increases the variance of the asset at time t + 1, Schinasi and Smith show that 
different portfolio rules yield different portfolio rebalancing responses (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Effects of increases in volatility on return on asset i 
  Correlation of returns of asset i and j 
Rule  Positive correlation between 
assets i and j 
Negative correlation between 
assets i and j 
Decrease in asset i 
Increase in asset j; 
Decrease in asset i 
Increase in asset j; 
Benchmark  
Decrease in asset i  
Increase in asset j; 
Decrease in asset i 
Decrease in asset j; 
Trade off 
Decrease in asset i 
Ambiguous effect on asset j; 
Decrease in asset i 
Ambiguous effect on asset j; 
Loss constraint 
 
For instance, under both the benchmark and tradeoff rules, given that the correlation 
between the two assets is positive, a volatility event in asset i will lead to a decrease in the 
position of asset i and increase in asset j. If the correlation is negative, then under the 
benchmark rule the same result holds, while under the tradeoff rule the portfolio manager will 
reduce the position in both risky assets. Conversely, they then show that under the loss 
constraint rule with positive correlation between assets, a volatility event in asset i can lead 
to a decrease in the position of asset j. 
The consequences of their analysis have significant implications for how one views the 
possible effects of crisis events on the foreign asset exposures of banks. Previous literature 
that has explored the effect of contagion has posited the notion that investors (banks 
included) respond to crisis events in one asset class by reducing their positions in other 
similarly risky asset classes. But how a bank responds to an increase in volatility due to the 
occurrence of a crisis depends heavily on the portfolio rule utilised. Additionally, the current 
literature does not account for the fact that banks may adjust the composition of their 
portfolios. Simply, one cannot make claims with respect to the responses of banks to crisis 
events. Rather, the question must be addressed from an empirical perspective. 
4.   Empirical model of foreign bank exposures 
4.1   Benchmark model 
The empirical model used to assess the effects of crises on the optimal portfolio behaviour of 
Canadian banks follows Goldberg (2001). Utilising basic portfolio theory, she posits that a 
bank’s exposure to a particular foreign country will be a function of the return of investment of 
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 that country, relative to the bank’s domestic country portfolio. Empirically, foreign country 
fundamentals can be proxied by the country’s real interest rates and real GDP growth, while 
domestic fundamentals are captured by domestic real interest rates and GDP growth. Thus, 
the foreign asset exposures of Canadian banks can be characterised by the following 
equation: 




j ijt jt j it i r i ijt X X Exp
11 2 1 ε β β α α  (1) 
where Expijt is the log of the real foreign asset exposure of bank i to foreign country j at time 
t, Xjt is a vector of foreign country macroeconomic variables and Xit is a vector of Canadian 
macroeconomic variables. Regional and bank fixed effects α  and α r i are entered to account 
for regional and bank specific differences: some foreign regions may, regardless of 
fundamentals, attract larger claims. 
4.2   Econometric issues 
This framework can be augmented to better reflect the portfolio decisions made by banks. 
First, instead of specifying bank and regional effects, the data are broken into country-bank 
observations across time. Thus, bank i’s exposure to country j across time t is one panel 
where the error term can be correlated within the panel. Similarly, bank i’s exposure to 
country k across time t is a separate panel, with error terms that are correlated within the 
panel. Second, to account for the possibility of state dependence in foreign asset exposures, 
(1) can be augmented to account for the fixed costs of commencing foreign claims, and the 
adjustment costs associated with their disposal. Third, to account for potential omitted 
variables, institutional characteristics can be included since financial intermediation could 
benefit from political stability and low levels of corruption. Thus, (1) is augmented as follows: 
∑ = − + + + + + =
K
i ijt jt jt it k ijt k ij ijt Z X X Exp Exp
1 2 1 ε δ β β λ α    (2) 
where αij is a bank-country fixed effect, Expt–k is a vector of lagged exposures, the X’s are 
vectors of the macroeconomic characteristics of the foreign countries and Canada, and Zjt is 
a measure of the political and institutional characteristics of the foreign country. This vector 
could include measures of political risk, bureaucratic quality, corruption, democracy, investor 
protection, law and order, and stability.
6 Estimation of (2) is complicated by the inclusion of 
lagged dependent variables, which would necessarily be correlated to the error term. 
However, utilisation of standard GMM estimation techniques can mitigate this problem. 
Additionally, in this instance, GMM would first difference the data by the ij dimension, thus 
accounting for the I(1) nature of the data.
7
4.3   Measures of contagion 
The benchmark model described above can be augmented to include a measure of 
contagion. But finding appropriate measures of informational contagion is problematic. 
                                                  
6   For instance, one would expect that positive changes in the level of investor protection would lead to higher 
levels of foreign claims, while controlling for fundamentals. 
7    If there is an equilibrium level of foreign asset exposures, then an error correction specification may be 
warranted. The equilibrium level could be based on the notion that banks hold a certain percentage of their 
portfolio in foreign assets, for the purposes of optimal portfolio diversification. However, there is no reason to 
suggest that the exposure to a particular country must be a certain level. Nevertheless, future research will 
need to consider this question. 
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 Ideally, the researcher would like to utilise a measure that captures a flow of information 
which would inform (rightly or wrongly) banks about the conditional moments of the return of 
assets but, at the same time, is not correlated closely to changes in fundamentals in the 
affected country. This is crucial in order to identify a “contagion” effect, and not simply a 
common shock or response to changes in fundamentals. Measuring contagion in this context 
proceeds as follows. Given that a crisis occurs in country i, does the bank change its 
exposure to country j, conditioning on the fundamentals that the crisis in i has on j? The idea 
is that the crisis in i reveals information about the volatility and mean of returns on country j’s 
assets, above and beyond what can be detected from changes in fundamentals. Then, the 
direction of the change in exposures, as noted by Schinasi and Smith, would be determined 
by the portfolio rule being used by the bank. 
I propose a simple measure of informational contagion. The contagion measure takes a 
positive value of one for country i if country j experiences a banking crisis and country i and j 
are in the same region. However, simple inspection would suggest that if there were a 
common shock that caused the crisis in j then the contagion measure may simply be 
proxying for this effect, even when controlling for fundamentals. A potential solution is to 
introduce an interaction term. The “interaction” contagion measure takes a value of one if 
country j experiences a banking crisis and country i and j are in the same region, and the 
bank has exposures in both countries. If the additional information of joint exposure induces 
changes in exposures, over and above the simple crisis event, then this would suggest that 
information is causing a change in behaviour. This test can be implemented by augmenting 
the benchmark model of foreign asset exposures (2) with the measure of informational 
contagion: 
∑ = − + + + + + + =
K
i ijt jt jt jt it k ijt k ij ijt C Z X X Exp Exp
1 2 1 ε θ δ β β λ α  (3) 
where C is the contagion measure. The measure C can also be augmented to include the 
amount of information that is generated by the crisis event. In this case, one could include 
the number of times the crisis is mentioned (or mentioned at all) in the interaction term. 
Crises that receive a greater number of “hits” in a newspaper database would take higher 
values of the index C. Similarly, crises that are not mentioned would receive lower 
“information” scores, and thus a lower value of C.
8
Alternative contagion measures can also be considered. As suggested by Ahluwalia (2000), 
a measure of “informational contagion” can be defined building on the visible similarities 
argument: if two economies share similar characteristics, then the occurrence of a crisis in 
one country may predict a change in the portfolio being held by the bank in the other country, 
even if there are no real linkages between the countries. Two variations of this index can be 
considered. The first variation (C2A) creates the index such that it takes a value of one for 
each country in the region that is having a crisis and has a macro characteristic beyond its 
threshold. The second variation (C2B) of the index takes a value of one for each macro 
characteristic that the non-crisis country has in common with the country having a crisis.  
Each measure of contagion will be considered in turn. 
B
                                                
9
Empirical estimation of the effects of contagion is complicated by the problem of 
identification. In most contagion studies, correlation between the measure of contagion and 
 
8   Clearly, countries that are more systemically important would receive more news coverage, and thus provide 
more information. However, identification can be achieved if the effect occurs even when fundamentals are 
controlled for. 
9    The second contagion index, in this case, uses yearly data to compare threshold values of the macro 
variables. Ideally, quarterly data would be used, but they are not available for many of the relevant series. 
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 other independent variables (such as macroeconomic variables) is likely. That is, the 
occurrence of a crisis in the same region as the affected country is typically correlated with 
macroeconomic outcomes in the same region, thus complicating identification. However, 
identification of the individual country effects from the contextual effects (a regional crisis or 
contagion index, for example) is possible if there is a non-linear relationship between the 
respective effects (Brock and Durlauf (2001) and (2007)). Specifically, Brock and Durlauf 
show that if non-linearities exist, then this is a sufficient condition for identification. To test for 
the presence of non-linearities between the contagion index and the individual-level country 
effects, a RESET test can be conducted.  
5.   Data  
The foreign asset exposures for all Canadian banks come from the consolidated quarterly 
banking statistics report compiled by the Bank of Canada.
10 Foreign asset exposures include 
all claims to every foreign jurisdiction where exposures exist. This includes deposits to other 
financial institutions, loans to financial institutions and firms, and securities, both government 
and corporate. These data are collected by location of booking: the foreign jurisdiction or at 
the Canadian head office. The data cover all Canadian banks’ exposures to over 150 
jurisdictions from 1984 to 2003.
11 Additional bank balance sheet data are collected, including 
assets, market capitalisation, and other bank specific characteristics. 
The macroeconomic data are from the International Financial Statistics and include standard 
measures of GDP growth rates, interest rates, inflation, government finances, current 
account, money supply, and private credit. The data on political institutions are from the 
International Country Risk Guide. This includes measures of bureaucratic quality, corruption, 
democracy, investor protection, law and order, and stability, which are combined into an 
overall measure of political risk from 1984 to the present. 
Banking crisis dates are initially taken from Glick and Hutchinson (1999) and updated by the 
author to the current period. However, official crisis dates may not be the relevant measure 
of when “information” becomes available to banks, and is only reported yearly. To better 
capture the exact timing of the crisis dates, an alternative dating system is used. Using Dow 
Jones Factiva, the date of a crisis is determined by the occurrence of the first event that is 
mentioned in the Dow Jones Factiva database of newspapers. This has the advantage of 
being able to specify the exact quarter when the crisis began, and is more likely to reflect the 
timing of the information available to bank managers. Furthermore, the intensity of the 
information can be assessed by examining the number of “hits” in the database. That is, how 
many times the crisis event is mentioned, and how long it persists. 
6.   Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics would suggest, at a glance, that Canadian banks are extensively 
globalised. Table 2 lists a sample of the countries to which Canadian banks had foreign 
                                                  
10   Consolidation is conducted as per guidelines in the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Guide. 
Foreign claims of domestic Canadian banks are adjusted to account for exchange rate revaluation. 
11   While there are over 50 banks operating in Canada, six banks account for 92% of the assets and 96% of all 
foreign exposures. The focus of this analysis is on the six largest banks in Canada. For the United States, 
Goldberg finds that the largest 10 banks account for 86% of foreign exposures. 
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 12 asset claims in 2002.  However, the extent of exposures has actually declined, relative to its 
peak in the 1980s. Table 3 lists the average, mean and median number of countries that 
each Canadian bank had foreign claims on from 1984 to 2002.
13 The size and extent of 
these foreign claims is considerable: total foreign claims, in constant 1997 dollars, were over 
$200 billion in 1984, rising to over $477.2 billion in 2002 (see Figure 1). As a percentage of 
total assets, however, the trend in foreign assets is quite stable. Figure 2 shows that foreign 
asset exposures in 2002 constituted 33% of total assets for Canadian banks. This is similar 
to the reported levels in the 1990s, but is considerably lower than the average of the 1980s, 
and is below its peak in 1984.  
 
Table 2 




Latin America  Asia  Offshore banking centres 
United States   Argentina   Sri Lanka   Bahamas 
United Kingdom   Brazil   India   Barbados 
Austria   Chile   Indonesia   Bermuda 
Belgium   Colombia   Korea   Cayman Islands 
Denmark   Ecuador   Philippines   
France   El Salvador   Singapore   
Germany   Guatemala   Thailand   
Italy   Honduras     
Netherlands   Mexico     
Norway   Paraguay     
Sweden   Peru     
Switzerland   Uruguay     
Japan   Venezuela     
Finland   Guyana     
Ireland   Jamaica     
Portugal      
Turkey      
Australia      
New Zealand       
Source: Bank of Canada. 
 
The composition of foreign asset exposures is also important to consider. Focusing only on 
deposits and loans, the proportion of exposures-to-assets has fallen, from 42% to only 21% 
from 1984 to 2002 (Figure 2). The rise in the holding of foreign securities accounts for much 
of the rise in total claims in the 1990s. Since foreign securities are predominated by US 
Treasuries, one could argue that banks have become less exposed to foreign risk (at least if 
one considers US T-Bills to be the most risk-free security in existence). 
                                                  
12   Overall, banks reported claims to over 159 countries. 
13   In terms of the panel to be estimated, this means that there will be at least 360 ij panels with a time dimension 
t of 76. 
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 Table 3 
Foreign asset exposures:  
Number of countries per bank reporting exposures > $1 million 
 All  banks 
Year Mean  Median 
1984 41  33 
1985 40  30 
1986 38  31 
1987 36  28 
1988 33  22 
1989 31  20 
1990 28  15 
1991 27  15 
1992 28  16 
1993 27  17 
1994 27  18 
1995 30  22 
1996 32  23 
1997 33  21 
1998 33  22 
1999 32  18 
2000 31  21 
2001 30  23 
2002 30  20 
Source: Bank of Canada. 
 
The value of foreign exposures by region is shown in Figure 3. The United States accounts 
for the majority of exposures at $295.7 billion in 2002, which is around 60% of total foreign 
exposures.
14 The increase in total claims is attributable to larger holdings of securities, 
particularly after 1994. The balance of remaining exposures occurs in the industrialised 
countries, Latin America and East Asia. The evolution of foreign claims to the industrialised 
countries follows that of the United States somewhat, with all claim types showing significant 
growth after 1993. Also, securities constitute a larger part of claims than ever before. 
Interestingly, exposures to Latin America fell as a share of total foreign exposures in the 
1980s and early 1990s, but have risen substantially in the last few years (Figure 3). Loan 
exposures fell sharply in the 1980s and early 1990s, but then grew quickly, along with 
deposits and securities. A similar pattern for Asia emerges, with decreases in the 1980s 
followed by increases in the 1990s, after 1993. However, the impact of the Asian crisis is felt, 
as loans eased and deposits plummeted after 1997.
15 Lastly, the origin of booking has 
                                                  
14   The secular increase, absolutely and proportionally, in US assets suggests that Canadian banks are not 
holding these assets simply due to their higher returns. Rather, it could be the case that US assets, in 
particular T-Bills, are held for other reasons, such as collateral or for derivatives trading purposes. Future 
research on the determinants of these holdings of US assets is warranted. 
15   The level of exposures to Africa and the Middle East is negligible. 
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 changed over the sample period. The ratio of claims booked inside Canada has fallen 
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Figure 4: Foreign Asset Exposures
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 The crisis dates, and additional information about the prominence of the crises are indicated 
by the number of “hits” in Dow Jones Factiva. The number of hits closely follows the 
occurrence of crises in the respective regions. For example, the number of hits for articles 
describing banking crises in East Asia rises sharply in 1997, and then slowly abates.
16 This 
information can be used in conjunction with the crisis dates to assess whether informational 
contagion exists.  
7.   Does contagion exist? Regression results 
The results of estimating the benchmark model of foreign asset exposures (equation (2)) by 
GMM in first differences is presented in Table 4. The GMM estimation technique is that 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Anderson and Hsiao (1981). All regressions 
include time dummies, and the right-hand macro variables are treated as exogenous. This 
latter claim is reasonable given that it is unlikely that the volume of Canadian banks’ asset 
exposures is sufficiently large to affect output and interest rates in the countries 
considered.
17 Four lags of the dependent variable are included in order to remove 
autocorrelation in the error term. Lagged levels of the dependent and exogenous macro 
variables are used as instruments for the endogenous lagged dependent variable, and the 
maximum number of lagged instruments is set at six.
18
For the entire sample of countries, the results show that previous levels of exposures are 
significant determinants of changes in the level of foreign asset exposures, suggesting that 
there is a large degree of inertia.
19 This could be due to the existence of fixed costs for 
commencing claims on foreign residents in a country, and the adjustment costs for altering 
the level of those claims. The degree of inertia is larger for securities than for loans and 
deposits.
20
The influence of macro variables is not strong. For total claims, foreign and domestic macro 
variables do not influence foreign exposures. Interestingly, there are significant but different 
impacts when claims are disaggregated into their respective types. For deposits, higher 
Canadian GDP growth leads to lower foreign deposits. This suggests that as the Canadian 
economy offers higher returns to domestic lending, funds lent to other countries’ banks are 
reduced. Except for the foreign real interest rate, the effect of the macro variables on loans is 
not significant. Foreign exposures in the form of securities are not correlated to foreign or 
domestic interest rates, or foreign or Canadian GDP growth.
21 Lastly, changes in political risk 





                                                  
16   The details of the search mechanism used are available from the author upon request. 
17   One step estimates are conducted for all regressions, for inference purposes. 
18   Inclusion of four lags of the dependent variable was sufficient to remove second order autocorrelation for most 
specifications. 
19   Only the largest 73 countries, in terms of exposures, are considered. 
20   These differences are statistically significant when comparing loans and deposits to securities. 
21   Preliminary results indicate that inclusion of lagged values of the macro variables does not alter the results. 
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 Table 4 
Benchmark model: GMM estimates 









Claims  0.1470* 0.1871* 0.3160* 0.2122*  t – 1 
 (0.0212)  (0.0192)  (0.0224)  (0.0194) 
Claims t – 2    0.0260**  0.0944*   0.0233*   0.0670* 
 (0.0148)  (0.0125)  (0.0144)  (0.0120) 
Claims t – 3    –0.0083  –0.0298*   0.0460*   0.0399* 
 (0.0126)  (0.0110)  (0.0135)  (0.0103) 
Interest RateFOR   0.1206  0.6165*   –0.2708  0.3737 
 (0.5628)  (0.2965)  (0.4026)  (0.2353) 
GDP –0.3041 –0.0485 –0.0560 –0.4301  FOR 
 (0.568)  (0.3850)  (0.4259)  (0.2917) 
Interest Rate     1.4606  0.8230 –1.9037 –0.5436  CAN
 (1.9680)  (1.4371)  (1.4095)  (1.0567) 
GDPCAN   –1.8887**   0.6195  –0.8466  –0.4393 
 (1.0998)  (0.7915)  (0.7348)  (0.5794) 
Political  Risk  0.0042  0.0097 –0.0004 –0.0018 
 (0.0090)  (0.0064)  (0.0062)  (0.0048) 
AR(2)   0.6390  0.0000  0.0000  0.2238 
9536 9522 5574  11508  N  
* indicates significance at the 5% level, ** indicates significance at the 10% level. Time dummies included. All 
independent variables are first differenced. Instrument matrix is limited to 6 lags. Right-hand variables are 
treated as exogenous. AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. 
 
The sample is then broken down into two groups to examine whether banks respond 
differently to changes in fundamentals depending on whether the assets are booked in the 
head office of the Canadian bank (booked inside) or if the claim is booked locally in the 
foreign jurisdiction (booked outside). Recent anecdotal evidence has suggested that locally 
booked claims should be less sensitive to contagion and more reliant on fundamentals. Table 
5 presents the results, by asset type, for claims booked inside and outside Canada. Deposits 
booked inside Canada have higher persistence than claims booked outside Canada – this 
may reflect the fact that booking at head office may be over longer maturities. With respect to 
fundamentals, deposits booked inside Canada do not respond to macro variables. However, 
deposits booked outside Canada respond negatively to changes in the real interest rate and 
Canadian GDP growth. The former is counterintuitive, as higher interest rates should draw 
more deposits. The latter suggests that higher Canadian GDP growth leads to a substitution 
away from foreign deposits for the higher returns to lending in Canada. Loans booked inside 
Canada are also more persistent that those booked outside. Interestingly, loans booked 
inside Canada fall as foreign interest rates rise, while the opposite is true for those booked in 
the foreign jurisdiction. There are no significant differences in the behaviour of securities by 
place of booking. Lastly, overall claims are less persistent when booked outside Canada. 
This stands in contradiction to the anecdotal evidence that claims booked locally will be less 
sensitive than claims booked inside Canada. 
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 Table 5 
Benchmark model: GMM estimates 
Dependent variable: ΔClaims (by type) 
 



















0.2423* 0.2114* 0.2040* 0.3550*  0.0285*  0.1103* 0.3219* 0.1237*  Claims t – 1 
(0.0208)  (0.0241) (0.0299) (0.0198) (0.0211)  (0.0216)  (0.0259) (0.0180)   
0.0231 0.0666* 0.0069  0.0370*  –0.0106 0.0200  –0.0024 –0.0060  Claims t – 2   
(0.0149)  (0.0165) (0.0206) (0.0132) (0.0157)  (0.0129)  (0.0158) (0.0119)   
–0.0037 0.0306**  0.0432*  0.0445*  –0.0641*  –0.0918  –0.0122  –0.0029  Claims t – 3   
(0.0137)  (0.0143) (0.0207) (0.0121) (0.0137)  (0.0118)  (0.0149) (0.0107)   
–0.2152 –0.0218  0.0559  –0.1278  –2.0188* 0.4729* –0.5092  0.0560  Int RateFOR  
(0.6861)  (0.4761) (0.3073) (0.4174) (0.7815)  (0.2381)  (0.4891) (0.2550)   
–0.5146  –1.1012** 0.6883 –0.4615  0.9024 0.4180 0.2042  0.0968  GDPFOR 
(0.7247)  (0.6658) (0.4401) (0.5269) (0.7306)  (0.3041)  (0.4616) (0.3199)   
2.8204  0.2699  –0.0810 4.8037*  0.3106  0.8680  –0.3046 0.1416  Int RateCAN  
(2.2556)  (2.3231) (1.3195) (1.8131) (2.1643)  (1.1350)  (1.4437) (1.1076)   
1.4182 0.5547 –1.0698 –0.0846  –2.3541**  0.3378  –1.0573 –0.8502  GDPCAN  
(1.3451)  (1.2930) (0.6869) (1.0086) (1.2401)  (0.6230)  (0.7599) (0.6146)   
0.0074  0.0065 0.0006 0.0059  0.0381*  –0.0009  –0.0002  0.0087**  Pol Risk 
(0.0111)  (0.0109) (0.0050) (0.0085) (0.0108)  (0.0052)  (0.0070) (0.0052)   
0.2489  0.8470 0.2849 0.9697 0.1237  0.5028  0.0000 0.0065  AR(2)  
7720 6964 2029  10606  7320  7800 4688  9823  N  
* indicates significance at the 5% level, ** indicates significance at the 10% level. Time dummies included. All independent 
variables are first differenced. Instrument matrix is limited to 6 lags. Right-hand variables are treated as exogenous. AR(2) is 
the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. Booked inside Canada refers to claims booked at head office. Booked outside 
Canada refers to claims booked in the foreign jurisdiction at a branch of the bank. 
 
The lack of significant relationships between macro fundamentals and claims may be related 
to the fact that banks’ portfolio rules behave differently by market. Table 6 presents estimates 
of equation (2) with the sample divided by region. The most striking feature is the persistence 
of exposures to the United States and Japan when compared to the other industrialised 
counties. While Latin America has high initial persistence, this is short-lived. The results 
suggest varying effects for macro variables on exposures. For the United States, total claims 
only respond positively to higher Canadian interest rates – this may be because higher 
interest rates are related to slower economic growth in Canada, particularly during the 1991 
recession. In this environment, banks may have substituted with US claims, and in particular, 
securities. For industrialised countries and Asia, higher foreign GDP is negatively related to 
total claims, a counterintuitive result. However, the positive coefficient on the foreign interest 
rate suggests substitution towards higher returns in the case of Asia. Overall, while there is 
some variation across regions, the effect of macro fundamentals on the level of exposures is 
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 Table 6 
Benchmark model: GMM estimates 














Claims  0.5328* 0.1567*  0.0644* 0.4955* 0.3331*  t – 1 
  (0.0310) (0.0193)  (0.0273) (0.0312) (0.0415) 
Claims t – 2    0.2335*  0.0400*  0.0818*  0.0399  0.2254* 
  (0.0299) (0.0136)  (0.0209) (0.0286) (0.0422) 
Claims t – 3    0.1608*  0.0140  –0.0088  0.0444  0.0859* 
  (0.0290) (0.0120)  (0.0202) (0.0283) (0.0410) 
Int RateFOR   1.2965  0.2859  1.4656*  0.0126  –1.3624 
  (2.5989) (0.2915)  (0.5234) (0.1527) (3.9010) 
GDP –0.7154 –0.8396*  –0.6159**  0.3922  1.6076  FOR 
  (1.8746) (0.3940)  (0.3835) (0.2521) (2.1255) 
Int RateCAN   2.9004**  1.2051  –3.4720  1.9297  –1.7145 
  (1.7314) (1.3536)  (2.5446) (1.9427) (2.7667) 
GDPCAN   –0.0152  –0.2241  0.4598  –0.5880  –3.6101* 
  (0.8315) (0.6602)  (1.1304) (0.8704) (1.4877) 
Pol Risk  –0.0089  –0.0048  –0.0095  0.0053  –0.0064 
  (0.0074) (0.0059)  (0.0077) (0.0067) (0.0098) 
AR(2)    0.0300 0.0003  0.1336 0.2523 0.0128 
687 8652  2461  1642  640  N  
* indicates significance at the 5% level, ** indicates significance at the 10% level. Time dummies included. All 
independent variables are first differenced. Instrument matrix is limited to 4 lags. Right-hand variables are 
treated as exogenous. AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. 
 
The impact of banking crises and contagion is presented in Table 7. For all countries 
(specifications (1) through (4)), the occurrence of a contemporaneous banking crisis does not 
affect foreign asset exposures. In terms of the theoretical model, a banking crisis can be 
considered to be a “volatility event” that contains information. However, it appears that this 
information does not affect the level of exposures. When the contemporaneous contagion 
index (C1) is entered, there is no evidence of contagion. This could be due to the fact that 
banks do not adjust their exposures immediately, but only slowly over time.
22 That is, when a 
country in the same region experiences a crisis and the bank has an exposure to the crisis 
country, it does not affect the foreign asset exposures in other countries in that region for the 
bank. The lack of a significant relationship may be due to the lag in the reaction to the crisis 
event. To account for this effect, the contagion index is entered with a lag. Strikingly, the 
effect is positive only for deposits: a crisis in another country in the region leads to higher 
deposits in the non-crisis countries. 
 
                                                  
22  Another possible explanation is that asset exposures that are booked in the foreign country react differently 
than exposures booked in country i of the head office of the bank (Goldberg (2001)). A closer examination of 
this issue is considered for future research. 
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 Table 7 
Benchmark model: GMM estimates, contagion index C1 
Dependent variable: ΔClaims (by type) 
 



















            Model 1 
Banking 
crisis  –0.0057  0.1159 0.2094  –0.0716 0.0417  0.0429  –0.2682 0.0180 





(C1)  0.0203  –0.0489  0.0000 –0.0348  –0.2375*  –0.0315 0.0977 –0.0740 
  (0.0472)  (0.0381) (0.0379) (0.0286) (0.0958)  (0.0623)  (0.0697) (0.0515) 
Model 2             
Banking 
crisis  –0.0155  0.0767 0.2112  –0.0950 0.0407  0.0266  –0.2945 0.0246 





(C1)  0.0875* 0.0151 –0.0143 –0.0249  –0.2581*  0.0370 0.1748*  –0.0942* 
  (0.0424)  (0.0340) (0.0330) (0.0252) (0.0933)  (0.0585)  (0.0659) (0.0478) 
* indicates significance at the 5% level, ** indicates significance at the 10% level. Lagged claims, macroeconomic variables, 
political risk and time dummies included. All independent variables are first differenced. Instrument matrix is limited to 6 lags. 
Right-hand variables are treated as exogenous. C1 is interaction of a regional crisis with shared exposures and the number of 
“hits” the crisis event received in the DJ Factiva database. 
 
The lack of significance may be the result of sample choice: perhaps crises only matter for 
developing countries. The model is re-estimated for developing countries only (specifications 
(5) through (8)). For the lagged contagion index the effect on deposits is now negative, but 
securities are positive, leading to an overall negative effect for total claims. This suggests 
that the occurrence of a crisis in another country in the same region where the bank has 
claims, when controlling for fundamentals, leads to a reduction in those claims. 
To check the robustness of this result, the second contagion index (C2) is estimated 
(Table 8). Two variations are considered. The first variation (C A 2 ) creates the index such that 
it takes a value of one for each country in the region that is having a crisis and has a macro 
characteristic beyond its threshold. The second variation (C2B) of the index takes a value of 
one for each macro characteristic that the non-crisis country has in common with the country 





                                                
 are 
only significant for deposits (and are the opposite of the expected sign). Inclusion of the 
lagged values of the contagion index is also considered. Both variations of the lagged C2 
indices are negatively related to securities, but are insignificant for the other types of claims. 
This result has two potential implications. First, banks do react to information from crises in 
 
23   The second contagion index, in this case, uses yearly data to compare threshold values of the macro 
variables. Ideally, quarterly data would be used, but they are not available for many of the relevant series. 
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 the same region, but only slowly, when conditioning on macro fundamentals, political risk and 
the state-dependent nature of foreign claims. And second, the reaction leads to lower 
exposures to securities. This suggests that banks do not “panic” in the presence of crisis 
events. The estimates are repeated for the developing countries with roughly similar results 
(Table 10), with the notable exception that there is a small, negative correlation between the 
lagged contagion index (C A) and total claims. However, for contagion C 2 2B, the effect is 
negative but insignificant. Interestingly, the effect on loans is positive in this latter case. 
Nevertheless, these results bear further investigation regarding the sensitivity of the results 
to alternate specifications of the “contagion” indices, and tests of the orthogonality of the 




Benchmark model: GMM estimates, contagion index C2 
Dependent variable: ΔClaims (by type) 
 
Contagion index C2A: Similarity by number of 
countries in crisis in region 
Contagion index C2B: Similarity by number of 




















Model 1             
Contagion 
Index (C )  0.0480*  –0.0092 –0.0271 –0.0101  0.0245*  –0.0034  –0.0093  0.0033  2
  (0.0239) (0.0188) (0.0213) (0.0145)  (0.0120)  (0.0098) (0.0119) (0.0075) 
Model 2             
Contagion 
Indext-1  
(C ) 0.0098  0.0050  –0.0571*  –0.0027  0.0068  0.0080  –0.0304*  0.0085  2
  (0.0238) (0.0187) (0.0208) (0.0144)  (0.0119)  (0.0096) (0.0115) (0.0073) 
Developing countries only 
Model 1             
Contagion 
Index (C )  0.0900* 0.0293 –0.0103 –0.0250  0.0685*  0.0232  –0.0129 –0.0062  2
  (0.0445) (0.0258) (0.0293) (0.0217)  (0.0299)  (0.0180) (0.0229) (0.0151) 
Model 2             
Contagion 
Indext-1  
(C2)  0.0195 0.0363 –0.0235 –0.0453* 0.0000  0.0399*  –0.0141 –0.0156 
  (0.0453) (0.0255) (0.0290) (0.0215)  (0.0295)  (0.0175) (0.0216) (0.0146) 
* indicates significance at the 5% level, ** indicates significance at the 10% level. Lagged claims, macroeconomic variables, 
political risk, banking crisis dummies and time dummies included. All independent variables are first differenced. Instrument 
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 Table 9 
Benchmark model: GMM estimates, contagion index C1 
Dependent variable: ΔClaims (by type) 
 




















Banking crisis  0.2684*  –0.1907*  –0.1090**  0.1650*  –0.4239*  –0.0366  –0.0138  –0.1495* 
  (0.0982) (0.0892)  (0.0594)  (0.0730)  (0.1043) (0.0497)  (0.0744)  (0.0489) 
Regional Crisis 
x Bank 
Exposure t-1  
(C ) 0.0214  –0.0071  0.0231**  0.0011  0.0478  0.0237  –0.0516*  0.0399*  1
  (0.0371) (0.0317)  (0.0117)  (0.0252)  (0.0339) (0.0165)  (0.0233)  (0.0155) 
Developing countries 
Banking crisis  0.0427  –0.0359*  –0.0266  0.2977*  –0.5245*  0.0504  0.2117  –0.1171 




(C1)  0.0921** 0.0278 0.0033 –0.0413 0.0794*  0.0574*  –0.0621 0.0680* 
  (0.0497) (0.0343)  (0.0096)  (0.0295)  (0.0473) (0.0196)  (0.0389)  (0.0201) 
* indicates significance at the 5% level, ** indicates significance at the 10% level. Lagged claims, macroeconomic variables, 
political risk and time dummies included. All independent variables are first differenced. Instrument matrix is limited to 6 lags. 
Right-hand variables are treated as exogenous. C1 is interaction of a regional crisis with shared exposures and the number of 
“hits” the crisis event received in the DJ Factiva database. 
 
8.   Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to examine the foreign asset exposures of Canadian banks 
and to determine whether they react to informational contagion. This study found that, while 
Canadian banks are very active globally, they are less so than in the 1980s. Canadian banks 
have a lower proportion of exposures in the form of deposits and loans than in the 1980s, but 
higher levels of foreign securities. The reaction of Canadian banks’ foreign exposures to 
crisis events is then explored. Banks’ foreign exposures display considerable inertia, as 
banks only slowly adjust their portfolios: they react only weakly to changes in macro-
variables and political risk. This also translates into a lack of the effect of crises on their level 
of exposures, at least in the short run. However, there is preliminary evidence that when 
countries share similar characteristics to countries in crisis, banks react to the event by 
changing the composition of their exposures, but only slowly. This result is striking, as it 
suggests that banks do not panic in the face of crises. Interestingly, foreign claims booked 
inside Canada were more persistent than claims booked in the foreign country. 
This study raises many questions for future research. The most obvious extension is to 
explore why Canadian banks do not adjust their portfolios of foreign assets rapidly in 
response to crisis events or changes in macro fundamentals. It could be the case that the 
adjustment occurs either on their domestic balance sheet or off-balance sheet. Second, the 
steady level of internationalisation also raises the simple question as to why banks are 
accumulating higher claims on securities, and lower claims in the form of deposits and loans. 
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 The exploration of these issues has important consequences for the Canadian financial 
system. 
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